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SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9525 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43562 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-17363 
      ) 
SHAWN VICTOR SHELTRA, JR., )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Shawn Sheltra, Jr. pled guilty to sexual abuse of a child under sixteen and was 
sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with two years fixed.  Mr. Sheltra contends 
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Sheltra an excessive 
sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case.  He also contends the 
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed the 
original sentence.  
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On September 29, 2014, Mr. Sheltra had sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-
old girl and provided her with marijuana.  (R., pp.6-7, 44-45; Presentence Investigation 
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Report (“PSI”), pp.3-6.)  He was charged by Indictment with lewd conduct with a minor 
child under sixteen, delivery of a controlled substance to a minor, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.6-8.)  Mr. Sheltra entered into an agreement with the State 
pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to sexual abuse of a minor child and the 
State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.  
(R., pp.43, 46-53.)  The district court accepted Mr. Sheltra’s guilty plea.  (Tr., p.26, L.21 
– p.27, L.2.)  The State then filed an Amended Information containing the new charge.  
(R., p.44.)   
The district court sentenced Mr. Sheltra to a unified term of fifteen years, with two 
years fixed.  (R., p.59.)  The court retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days with the 
recommendation that Mr. Sheltra participate in the Sex Offender Assessment Group 
rider.  (R., p.59.)  The judgment of conviction was entered on March 23, 2015.  
(R., pp.58-62.)  The district court held a rider review hearing on September 10, 2015, 
and relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.71-72; Tr., p.55, Ls.18-22.)  Mr. Sheltra filed a 
motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reduction of sentence.  
(R., pp.73-77.)  He then filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice of appeal.  
(R., pp.81-83, 88-92.)  The district court denied Mr. Sheltra’s Rule 35 motion on 
November 9, 2015.1   
 
                                            
1 The Clerk’s Record was prepared on November 3, 2015, and does not contain the 
district court’s order denying Mr. Sheltra’s Rule 35 motion.  Contemporaneously with the 
filing of this Brief, Mr. Sheltra is filing a Motion to Augment the Record to include the 
district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.  Because he did not support his Rule 
35 motion with any additional evidence or information, Mr. Sheltra does not challenge 
the district court’s denial of this motion in light of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 
(2007).  
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Sheltra a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with two years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case?  
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Sheltra? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Sheltra A Unified 
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Two Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors 
That Exist In This Case 
 
Mr. Sheltra asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with two years fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed 
by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court 
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is 
reasonableness.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A 
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness 
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having 
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of 
the public interest.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
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The first factor for this Court to independently examine is the nature of the 
offense.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Mr. Sheltra was twenty years old at the time of 
the offense.  (PSI, p.1.)  He met his teenage victim on Facebook and believed she was 
sixteen or seventeen years old.  (PSI, pp.4, 5.)  He and a friend met the victim and her 
friend in person after the victim messaged that she wanted “a high” and “a hug.”  (PSI, 
p.110.)  Mr. Sheltra messaged that “[y]ou’ll get a hug and maybe a spin . . . [i]f u [sic] 
want” and she messaged, “I do.”  (PSI, p.111.)  There is no indication that Mr. Sheltra 
knew the victim’s exact age, and the victim said she told Mr. Sheltra she was a high 
school student.  (PSI, pp.113, 116.)   
After they met in person, Mr. Sheltra took the victim to his house, where they 
smoked marijuana and, according to the victim, got “pretty ‘stoned.’”  (PSI, p.116.)  
Mr. Sheltra then had sex with the victim.  (PSI, p.3.)  The police became involved after 
the victim’s mother reported her daughter missing, and the victim was arrested on a 
runaway charge and transported to a juvenile detention center.  (PSI, pp.108, 132.)  The 
victim reported the alleged rape after arriving at the juvenile detention center.  (PSI, 
p.137.)  Neither the victim nor the victim’s mother provided a statement to the 
presentence investigator or spoke at sentencing.  (PSI, p.5; Tr. p.33, Ls.11-14.)  This 
was not the first time the victim had been sexually involved with an older man.  (PSI, 
p.133.) 
The district court should have considered the fact that the offense was, at least in 
part, encouraged by the victim, who represented herself as a high school student.  See 
State v. Stiffler, 114 Idaho 935, 938 (Ct. App. 1988) (“Lest we sound naïve, we do 
recognize that the justification for preventing the sexual exploitation of minors may 
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diminish where sexually sophisticated adolescents are involved.  Though a female 
adolescent’s precociousness may be irrelevant to the charge of statutory rape, we 
believe such circumstances may properly be considered in imposing punishment.”).  
The district court should also have considered the fact that Mr. Sheltra (and the victim) 
were under the influence of drugs at the time of the offense.  See State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 91, 645 P.2d 323, 325 (1982) (reducing the defendant’s sentence because, in 
part, “the trial court did not give proper consideration of . . . the part [the defendant’s 
alcohol problem] played in causing defendant to commit the crime”).  And the district 
court should have considered the fact that Mr. Sheltra “was honest with law 
enforcement” and admitted the crime, which the prosecutor acknowledged at 
sentencing.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-17.)   
 The next factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the 
offender.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  This was Mr. Sheltra’s first felony conviction, 
and he had no history of sex offenses.  (PSI, pp.23, 32.)  He was the victim of physical 
abuse as a child, and had a very unstable home life.  (PSI, pp.10-11.)  He lived primarily 
with his mother and step-mother, and spent some time in foster care and approximately 
two years in a juvenile facility.  (PSI, pp.10-11.)  He began smoking marijuana at age 
eleven and drinking alcohol at age twelve.  (PSI, p.16.)  He was shot with a pellet gun at 
the age of twelve and lost sight in his left eye.  (PSI, p.14.)  He has been diagnosed with 
conduct disorder and bipolar disorder and has a history of poly-substance abuse.  (PSI, 
pp.15-16, 80.)  Mr. Sheltra is clearly in need of substance abuse and mental health 
services, not a lengthy prison sentence.   
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The third factor for this Court to independently examine is the protection of the 
public interest.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Mr. Sheltra recognized the potential harm 
that his actions could have on the victim.  (PSI, pp.17-18.)  Although his psychosexual 
evaluation concluded he presented a high risk to re-offend, he was determined to be 
amenable to treatment.  (PSI, pp.26-27.)  The psychologist who conducted Mr. Sheltra’s 
psychosexual evaluation recommended he receive treatment in a structured 
environment, and the presentence investigator stated Mr. Sheltra “seems to be 
successful” in structured environments and “would greatly benefit from co-occurring 
mental health and substance use treatment.”  (PSI, pp.21, 62.)   
On the record presented, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Sheltra a unified sentence of fifteen years, with two years fixed.  The court 
should have imposed a lesser term of incarceration. 
   
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction  
Over Mr. Sheltra 
 
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse 
of discretion.  See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-
2601(4).  Mr. Sheltra acknowledges that the North Idaho Correctional Institution 
recommended relinquishment.  (PSI, p.211.)  He nonetheless contends the district court 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction because it should have given him 
another chance at a rider or placed him on probation.  (PSI, p.230.)   
The APSI reflects that Mr. Sheltra served as a teacher’s aide in one of his groups 
and “did well with his responsibility.”  (PSI, p.215.)  Mr. Sheltra learned a lot about the 
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offense he committed and about his criminal behavior more generally.  When asked 
what he learned on his rider, he explained: 
I learned not to hold things back from your group because you won’t 
receive the help you need.  I understand why I am/was attracted to 
younger girls.  It was because I felt they were easier to manipulate and 
control.  I am a controlling person so I want power over others.  I realize I 
have a codependency and loneliness issues but also a social rejecting 
[sic].  I want to be liked by others.  I learned that anyone under the age of 
18 cannot consent to anything.  I learned that more than just the victim I 
created and her family plus my family is not the only ones that were 
affected by the crime I committed [sic]. 
 
(PSI, pp.214-15.)  This indicates a high level of insight and suggests Mr. Sheltra would 
have been successful on a second rider or on probation. 
Prior to his rider review hearing, Mr. Sheltra submitted a letter to the district court 
in which he explained, “I let my pride get in the way of this chance to better myself to 
become a productive member of society but I also let my emotions control me.”  (PSI, 
p.229).  At his rider review hearing, Mr. Sheltra told the district court that he “want[ed] to 
change and get help” and was “willing to surrender [his] criminal lifestyle.”  (PSI, pp.230-
31.)  He also told the court that he “[felt] like [his] meds were not working.”  (Tr., p.53, 
L.8.)  In light of Mr. Sheltra’s insight into his behavior and his expressed desire to be 
successful, the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sheltra respectfully requests that the Court vacate his sentence and either 
reduce the sentence as it deems appropriate or remand to the district court for 
resentencing.  He also requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and either place him on probation or remand to the district 
court for a new rider review hearing.   
 DATED this 7th day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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